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SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND  EXPECTED UTILITY 
WITHOUT ADDITIVITY 
BY DAVID SCHMEIDLEIS 
An act maps states of nature  to outcomes;  deterministic  outcomes  as well as random 
outcomes are included.  Two acts f  and g  are comonotonic,  by definition,  if it never 
happens  that f(s)  >-  f(t)  and g(t) >- g(s)  for some states  of nature  s and t. An axiom  of 
comonotonic  independence  is introduced  here.  It weakens  the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
axiom of independence  as follows: If f >- g  and if f,  g,  and h  are comonotonic, then 
cff +(l-a)h>-ag+(1  -ac)h. 
If a nondegenerate,  continuous,  and  monotonic  (state  independent)  weak  order  over  acts 
satisfies  comonotonic  independence,  then it induces a unique non-(necessarily-)additive 
probability  and a von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility. Furthermore,  one can compute  the 
expected  utility of an act with respect  to the nonadditive  probability,  using the Choquet 
integral. 
This extension  of the expected  utility  theory  covers  situations,  as the Ellsberg  paradox, 
which are inconsistent  with additive  expected  utility.  The concept  of uncertainty  aversion 
and interpretation  of comonotonic  independence  in the context  of social  welfare  functions 
are included. 
KEYwoRDs:  Comonotonic  independence,  uncertainty  aversion,  expected  utility,  subjec- 
tive probability. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
BAYESIAN  STATISTICAL  TECHNIQUES  are applicable when  the  information  and 
uncertainty  with respect to the parameters  or hypotheses  in question can be 
expressed  by a probability  distribution.  This prior  probability  is also the focus of 
most of the criticism  against  the Bayesian  school.  My starting  point is to join the 
critics in attacking a certain aspect of the prior probability:  The probability 
attached  to an uncertain  event does not reflect  the heuristic  amount  of informa- 
tion that led to  the assignment  of  that probability.  For example, when the 
information  on the occurrence  of two events  is symmetric  they are assigned  equal 
prior  probabilities.  If the events  are  complementary  the probabilities  will be 1/2, 
independently  of whether  the symmetric  information  is meager  or abundant. 
There are two (unwritten?)  rules for assigning  prior  probabilities  to events in 
case of uncertainty.  The first says that symmetric  information  with respect to 
the occurrence  of events  results  in equal  probabilities.  The second  says that  if the 
space is  partitioned into  k  symmetric  (i.e., equiprobable)  events, then the 
probability of  each event is  l/k.  I  agree with the first rule and object to 
the second. In the example  above,  if each of the symmetric  and complementary 
1I am thankful  to Roy Radner  for comments  on the previous  version  presented  at Oberwolfach, 
1982.  Thanks  are due also to Benyamin  Shitovitz,  and  anonymous  referees  for pointing  out numerous 
typos in previous  versions.  Partial  financial  support  from the Foerder  Institute  and NSF Grant  No. 
SES 8026086,  is gratefully  acknowledged.  Parts  of this research  have been done at the University  of 
Pennsylvania,  and at  the Institute for Mathematics  and its Applications  at  the University  of 
Minnesota. 
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uncertain  events is assigned  the index 3/7,  the number  1/7,  1/7  = 1 -  (3/7  + 
3/7),  would indicate the decision  maker's  confidence  in the probability  assess- 
ment. Thus, allowing  nonadditive  (not necessarily  additive)  probabilities  enables 
transmission or  recording of  information that additive probabilities  cannot 
represent. 
The idea of  nonadditive  probabilities  is  not new. Nonadditive (objective) 
probabilities  have been in use in physics  for a long time (Feynman  (1963)).  The 
nonadditivity  describes  the deviation of elementary  particles  from mechanical 
behavior  toward  wave-like  behavior.  Daniel Ellsberg  (1961) presented  his argu- 
ments against necessarily  additive  (subjective)  probabilities  with the help of the 
following  "mind experiments":  There  are two urns  each containing  one hundred 
balls. Each ball is either  red or black.  In urn I there  are fifty balls of each color 
and there is no additional  information  about urn II.  One ball is chosen at 
random  from each urn.  There  are four events,  denoted IR, IB, IIR, IIB, where 
IR denotes the event that the ball chosen from  urn I is red, etc. On each of the 
events a bet is offered:  $100 if the event  occurs  and zero if it does not. According 
to  Ellsberg most decision makers  are indifferent  between betting on  IR  and 
betting on IB and are similarly  indifferent  between  bets on IIR and IIB. It may 
be that the majority  are indifferent  among all four bets. However,  there is a 
nonnegligible  proportion  of decision  makers  who prefer  every  bet from  urn I (IB 
or IR)  to every bet from urn II  (IIB  or IIR). These decision makers  cannot 
represent  their beliefs with respect  to the occurrence  of uncertain  events  through 
an additive  probability. 
The most compelling  justification  for representation  of beliefs about uncertain 
events through  additive  prior  probability  has been suggested  by Savage.  Building 
on previous  work  by Ramsey,  de Finetti,  and  von Neumann-Morgenstern,  Savage 
suggested  axioms  for decision  theory  that  lead to the criterion  of maximization  of 
expected  utility. The expectation  operation  is carried  out with respect  to a prior 
probability  derived  uniquely  from  the decision  maker's  preferences  over  acts.  The 
axiom violated by the preference  of the select minority  in the example  above is 
the "  sure thing principle",  i.e., Savage's  P2. 
In this paper a simplified  version  of Savage's  model is used. The simplification 
consists of the introduction  of objective  or physical  probabilities.  An act in this 
model assigns  to each state an objective  lottery  over deterministic  outcomes.  The 
uncertainty  concerns  which state will occur. Such a model containing  objective 
and subjective probabilities  has been suggested by Anscombe and Aumann 
(1963). They speak about roulette  lotteries  (objective)  and horse lotteries  (sub- 
jective). In the presentation  here the version in Fishburn  (1970) is used. The 
von Neumann-Morgenstern,  (N-M), utility  theorem  used here can also be found 
in Fishburn  (1970). 
The concept of objective  probability  is considered  here as a physical  concept 
like acceleration,  momentum,  or temperature;  to construct  a lottery with given 
objective  probabilities  (a roulette  lottery)  is a technical  problem  conceptually  not 
different  from building  a thermometer.  When a person  has constructed  a "  per- 
fect" die, he assigns a probability  of 1/6  to each outcome.  This probability  is SUBJECTIVE  PROBABILITY  573 
objective in the same sense as the temperature  measured  by the thermometer. 
Another person can check and verify the calibration  of the thermometer.  Simi- 
larly, he can verify the perfection of  the die by measuring  its  dimensions, 
scanning  it to verify uniform  density,  etc....  Rolling the die many times is not 
necessarily  the exclusive  test for verification  of objective  probability. 
On the other hand, the subjective  or personal probability  of  an event is 
interpreted  here as the number  used in calculating  the expectation  (integral)  of a 
random  variable.  This definition  includes  objective  or physical  probabilities  as a 
special case where there is no doubt as to which number  is to be used. This 
interpretation  does not impose any restriction  of additivity  on probabilities,  as 
long as it is possible  to perform  the expectation  operation  which  is the subject  of 
this work. 
Subjective  probability  is derived  from a person's  preferences  over acts. In the 
Anscombe-Aumann  type model usually  five assumptions  are imposed  on prefer- 
ences  to  define unique additive subjective probability and von  Neumann- 
Morgenstern  utility over outcomes.  The first three assumptions  are essentially 
von Neumann-Morgenstern's-weak  order,  independence,  and continuity- and 
the fourth assumption  is equivalent  to Savage's  P3, i.e., state-independence  of 
preferences.  The additional  assumption  is nondegeneracy;  without  it uniqueness 
is not guaranteed. 
The example  quoted  earlier  can be embedded  in such a model.  There  are four 
states:  (IB,  IIB),  (IB, IIR),  (IR,  IIB),  (IR,  IIR).  The  deterministic outcomes 
are sums of dollars.  For concreteness  of the example,  assume  that there  are 101 
deterministic  outcomes:  $0,  $1,  $2,... ,$100. An act assigns  to each state a proba- 
bility distribution  over the outcomes.  The bet "$100 if IIB" is an act which 
assigns  the (degenerate  objective)  lottery  of receiving  "$100  with  probability  one" 
to each state in the event IIB and "zero dollars  with probability  one" to each 
state in the event IIR. The bet on  IIR  is similarly  interpreted.  Indifference 
between these two acts (bets),  the independence  condition,  continuity,  and weak 
order imply indifference  between either of  them and the constant act which 
assigns to each state the objective  lottery  of receiving  $100 with probability  1/2 
and receiving  zero dollars  with probability  1/2.  The same considerations  imply 
that the constant act above is indifferent  to either  of the two acts (bets): "$100 
if  IB"  and "$100 if  IR". Hence the indifference  between IB  and IR  and 
the indifference  between IIB and IIR in Ellsberg's  example,  together  with the 
von Neumann-Morgenstern  conditions,  imply indifference  between  all four bets. 
The nonnegligible  minority  of Ellsberg's  example  does not share  this indifference: 
they are indifferent  between  the constant  act (as above)  and each  bet from  urn I, 
and prefer  the constant  act to each bet from  urn II. 
Our  first  objective  consists  of restatement,  or more  specifically  of weakening,  of 
the independence  condition  such  that the new assumption  together  with the other 
three assumptions  can be consistently  imposed on the preference  relation  over 
acts. In particular  the special  preferences  of the example  become  admissible.  It is 
obvious that the example's  preferences  between  bets (acts) do not admit  additive 
subjective  probability.  Do they define  in some consistent  way a unique  nonaddi- 574  DAVID SCHMEIDLER 
tive subjective  probability,  and if so, is there  a way to define  the expected  utility 
maximization  criterion  for the nonadditive  case? 
An affirmative  answer  to this problem  is presented  in the third section.  Thus 
the new model rationalizes  nonadditive  (personal)  probabilities  and admits the 
computation  of expected  utility with respect to these probabilities.  It formally 
extends the additive  model and it makes  the expected  utility criterion  applicable 
to cases where  additive  expected  utility  is not applicable. 
Before turning to a precise and detailed  presentation  of the model, another 
heuristic  observation  is made.  The nomenclature  used in economics  distinguishes 
between risk and uncertainty.  Decisions in a risk situation are precisely the 
choices among roulette  lotteries.  The probabilities  are objectively  given; they are 
part of the data. For this case the economic  theory  went beyond  von Neumann- 
Morgenstern  utility and defined concepts of risk aversion,  risk premium,  and 
certainty  equivalence.  Translating  these concepts  to the case of decisions  under 
uncertainty  we can speak  about uncertainty  aversion,  uncertainty  premium,  and 
risk equivalence.  Returning  to the example,  suppose  that betting  $100 on IIR is 
indifferent  to betting  $100  on a risky  event  with an (objective)  probability  of 3/7. 
Thus, the subjective  probability  of an event  is its risk  equivalent  (P(IIR)  = 3/7). 
In  this example the number 1/7  computed earlier expresses the uncertainty 
premium in terms of risk. Note that nonadditive  probability  may not exhibit 
consistently  either  uncertainty  aversion  or uncertainty  attraction.  This is similar 
to  the case of  decisions in risk situations where von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility (of money) may be neither  concave  nor convex. 
2. AXIOMS  AND BACKGROUND 
Let X be a set and Y be the set of distributions  over X with finite supports 
Y = {y:  X-+ [0, 1ly(x)  * 0 for finitely  many  x 's in X 
and  E  y(x)  = 1 
xeX 
For notational simplicity  we identify X  with the subset { y E Yly(x) = 1 for 
some x in X}  of Y. 
Let S be a set and let 2 be an algebra  of subsets  of S. Both sets, X and S are 
assumed  to be nonempty.  Denote by Lo the set of all 2-measurable  finite  valued 
functions  from S to Y and denote  by LC  the constant  functions  in Lo, Let L be a 
convex subset of  yS  which  includes  Lc. Note that Y can be considered  a subset 
of some linear  space,  and yS, in turn,  can then  be considered  as a subspace  of the 
linear  space of all functions  from S to the first  linear  space.  Whereas  it is obvious 
how to perform convex combinations  in Y it should be stressed  that convex 
combinations  in yS  are performed  pointwise.  I.e., for f  and g in yS  and a in 
[0, 11, af + (1 -  a)g  = h where h(s)  = af(s)  + (1 -  a)g(s)  on S. 
In the neo-Bayesian  nomenclature,  elements  of X are (deterministic)  outcomes, 
elements  of Y are random  outcomes  or (roulette)  lotteries,  and elements  of L are SUBJECTIVE  PROBABILITY 
acts (or horse lotteries). Elements of S  are states (of nature) and elements of  2 
are events. 
The  primitive  of  a  neo-Bayesian  decision  model  is  a  binary  (preference) 
relation over L to be denoted by  >  . Next are stated several properties (axioms) 
of the preference relation, which will be used in the sequel. 
(i) WEAK  ORDER:  (a) For all f and g in L: f > g or g  f.  (b) For allf,  g,  and h 
in L:  Iff  g and g  h,  then  f  h. 
The relation  >  on  L  induces a relation also denoted by  >  on  Y: y  _ z  iff 
yS >-  zs  where yS denotes the constant function y on S (i.e.,  y }s).  As usual,  >- 
and  -  denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively, of  >  . 
DEFINITION:  Two acts f  and g  in  yS  are said to be  comonotonic if for no s 
and  t in S,  f(s)  >f(t)  and g(t)  > g(s). 
A constant act f,  i.e., f =y  for some y in Y, and any act g are comonotonic. 
An  act f  whose statewise lotteries { f(s)}  are mutually indifferent, i.e., f(s)  y 
for  all  s  in  S,  and any act  g  are comonotonic.  If  X  is  a set of  numbers and 
preferences respect the usual order on numbers, then any two X-valued functions 
f  and  g  are comonotonic iff (f(s)  -f(t))(g(s)  -  g(t))  > 0 for all s  and t in  S. 
Clearly, IIR  and IIB of the Introduction are not comonotonic. (Comonotonic- 
ity stands for common monotonicity.) 
Next  our new axiom for neo-Bayesian decision theory is introduced. 
(ii)  COMONOTONIC  INDEPENDENCE:  For all pairwise comonotonic  acts f,  g and h 
in L and for all a in ]O,1[: f > g implies af + (1 -  a)h >- ag + (1 -  a)h.  (0,1[  is 
the open unit interval.) 
Elaboration of this condition is delayed until after condition (vii). 
Comonotonic  independence  is  clearly  a  less  restrictive condition  than  the 
independence  condition stated below. 
(iii) INDEPENDENCE:  For allf,  g and h in L and for all a in ]0, 1[: f > g implies 
af + (1 -  a)h  >-  ag + (1 -  a)h. 
(iv) CONTINUITY: For all f,  g and h in L:  If f > g and g >  h,  then there are a 
and f  in ]0,1[  such that af+  (1 -  a)h > g and g >- fi+  (1 - f)h. 
Next,  two versions of state-independence are introduced. The intuitive mean- 
ing of each of these conditions is that the preferences over random outcomes do 
not depend on the state that occurred. The first version is the one to be used here. 
The second version is stated for comparisons since it is the common one in the 
literature. 
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(v) MONOTONICITY:  For allf  and g in L:  If f(s)  > g(s)  on S then f  g. 
(vi) STRICT  MONOTONICITY:  For all f and g in L,  y and z in Y and E in 2:  If 
f > g,  f(s)  =y  on E and g(s)  = z on E,  andf(s)  = g(s)  on Ec,  then  y > z. 
OBSERVATION:  If L = L0, then (vi) and (i) imply (v). 
PROOF: Let f  and g be finite  step functions  such  that f(s)    g(s)  on s. There 
is a finite chain f=  h0, h1,...,  hk = g where  each pair of consecutive  functions 
hi_l, hi are constant on the set on which they differ.  For this pair (vi) and (i) 
imply (v). Transitivity  (i)(b) of  ,  concludes  the proof. 
Clearly  (i) and (v) imply (vi). 
For the sake of completeness  we list as axiom: 
(vii) NONDEGENERACY:  Not for all f and g in L,  f > g. 
Out of the seven axioms  listed here the completeness  of the preferences,  (i)(a), 
seems to me the most restrictive  and most imposing  assumption  of the theory. 
One can view the weakening  of the completeness  assumption  as a main  contribu- 
tion of all other axioms. Imagine  a decision maker  who initially has a partial 
preference  relation over acts. After an additional  introspection  she accepts the 
validity  of several  of the axioms.  She can then extend  her preferences  using these 
axioms.  For example,  if she ranks  f > g and g > h, and if she accepts  transitivity, 
then she concludes  that f > h. From this point of view, the independence  axiom, 
(iii), seems the most powerful  axiom for extending  partial preferences.  Given 
f>- g and independence  we get for all h in L and a in ]0,1[: f'  af + (1 -  a)h 
>- ag + (1 -  a)h -g'.  However  after  additional  retrospection  this  implication 
may be too powerful to be acceptable.  For example,  consider the case where 
outcomes are real numbers  and S = [0,27r].  Let f  and g be two acts defined: 
f(s)  = sin (s)  and  g(s)  = sin(s  + 7r/2) = cos (s).  The preferences f > g  may be 
induced by the rough evaluation  that the event [?r/3,4sr/3] is more probable 
than its complement.  Define the act  h by  h(s)=  sin(77s). In this case the 
structure  of the acts f' = if +  h and g' = 'g + !h is far from transparent  and 
the automatic  implication  of independence,  f' >  g', may seem doubtful to the 
decision  maker.  More  generally:  the ranking  f > g implies  some  rough  estimation 
by the decision maker  of the probabilities  of events (in the algebra)  defined  by 
the acts f  and g. If mixture  with an arbitrary  act h is allowed,  the resulting  acts 
f'  and g' may define a much finer  (larger)  algebra  (especially  when the algebra 
defined by h is qualitatively  independent  of the algebras  of f  and g). Careful 
retrospection  and comparison  of the acts f' and g' may lead them  to the ranking 
g' >-  f' (as in the case of the Ellsberg  paradox)  contradictory  to the implication  of 
the independence axiom. Qualifying  the comparisons  and the application  of 
independence  to comonotonic  acts rules  out the possibility  of contradiction.  If f, 
g, and h are pairwise  comonotonic,  then the comparison  of f  to g is not very 
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different  from the comparison  of f'  to g'. Hence the decision  maker  can accept 
the validity of the implication:  f >- g  f'  >- g', without fear of running  into a 
contradiction.  Note that  accepting  the validity  of comonotonic  independence,  (ii), 
means accepting the validity of  the above implication without knowing the 
specific  acts f, g, h, f', g', but knowing  that all five are pairwise  comonotonic. 
Before presenting  the von Neumann-Morgenstern  theorem  we point out that 
stating  the axioms  of (i) weak  order,  (iii) independence,  and (iv) continuity  do not 
require  that the preference  relation :  be defined  on a set L containing  Lc. Only 
the convexity  of L is required  for (ii) and (iii). 
VON  NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN  THEOREM:  Let M  be a  convex subset of some 
linear space,  with a binary relation  >j  defined on it.  A  necessary and sufficient 
condition  for the relation  ,  to satisfy (i)  weak order, (iii) independence, and (iv) 
continuity is  the existence of an  affine real valued function,  say  w,  on M  such 
that for all f  and g in M: f  >  g iff w(f  ) >  w(g).  (Affinity of w means that w(af  + 
(1-  a)g)  = aw(f)  + (1-a)w(g)  for  O  < a < 1.)  Furthermore, an  affine real 
valued function w'  on M  can replace w in the above statement iff there exist  a 
positive number a and a real number  ,B such that w'(f ) = aw(f  ) + /3 on M. 
As mentioned  earlier,  for proof of this theorem  and the statement  and proof of 
Anscombe-Aumann  Theorem  below, the reader  is referred  to Fishburn  (1970). 
IMPLICATION:  Suppose  that a binary  relation >-  on some convex  subset L of 
Ys  with Lc  C L  satisfies (i) weak order, (ii) comonotonic  independence,  and 
(iv) continuity.  Suppose  also that there  is a convex subset M of L with Lc  c M 
such that any two acts in  M  are comonotonic.  Then by the von Neumann- 
Morgenstem Theorem  there is an affine function on  M, to be denoted by J, 
which  represents  the binary  relation  - on M. I.e., for all f  and g in M: f >- g if 
J(f ) > J(g).  Clearly,  if M = LC  _ {y  e  Y)  any two acts in M are comono- 
tonic. Hence, if a function u is defined  on Y by u(y) =  J(ys),  then u is affine 
and represents  the induced  preferences  on Y. The affinity  of u implies u(y)= 
Ex  e  xy  (x)  u(x). 
When  subjective  probability  enters  into the calculation  of expected  utility  of an 
act, an integral  with respect  to a finitely  additive  set function  has to be defined. 
Denote by P  a finitely additive  probability  measure  on 2  and let a be a real 
valued 2-measurable  function  on S. For the special  case where a is a finite  step 
function, a can be uniquely  represented  by EYk  laiEi*  where  a, > a2>  ...  >  ak 
are the values that a  attains and Ei* is the indicator  function on S of Ei 
{s E SIa(s) = ai} for i=  1,...,  k. Then 
k 
jadP=  P(Ei)ai. 
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The more general case where a is not finitely valued is treated as a special case of 
nonadditive probability. 
ANSCOMBE-AUMANN  THEOREM:  Suppose that a preference  relation L  on L = Lo 
satisfies (i)  weak order, (iii) independence,  (iv) continuity, (vi) strict monotonicity, 
and  (vii)  nondegeneracy. Then there exist  a  unique finitely  additive probability 
measure P on 2  and an affine real valued  function u on Y such that for all f and g 
in Lo: 
f  g  if  fu(f())dP 
>s(g(.))dP. 
Furthermore, if  there exist P  and u as  above,  then the preference relation they 
induce on Lo satisfied conditions  (i), (iii), (iv), (vi), and (vii). Finally, the  function u 
is unique up to a positive linear transformation. 
There are three apparent differences between the statement of the main result 
in  the next  section  and the Anscombe-Aumann Theorem above: (i) Instead of 
strict monotonicity,  monotonicity is used. It has been shown in the Observation 
that  it  does  not  make  a  difference. However,  for  the  forthcoming  extension, 
monotonicity  is  the  natural  condition.  (ii)  Independence  is  replaced  with 
comonotonic  independence. (iii) The finitely additive probability measure P  is 
replaced with a nonadditive probability v. 
3. THEOREM 
A real valued set function v on 2  is termed nonadditive  probability if it satisfies 
the normalization conditions v(+)  = 0 and v(S)  = 1, and monotonicity, i.e., for 
all E  and G in 2:  E c  G implies v(E)  < v(G). We now introduce the definition 
of  fsadv  for v nonadditive probability and a = £Ek_aiEi* a finite step function 
with  a1 >  at  >  .  >  a/k and  (Ei)k  1 a partition  of  S.  Let  ak +  =  0  and  define 
k 
fsadv=  E (  -  ai+) 1)  U  E 
i=l  j=l  / 
For the special case of v additive the definition above coincides with the usual 
one mentioned in the previous section. 
THEOREM:  Suppose that the preference relation L  on L = Lo satisfies (i)  weak 
order, (ii)  comonotonic independence, (iv)  continuity, (v)  monotonicity, and  (vii) 
nondegeneracy. Then there exist a  unique nonadditive  probability v on 2  and an 
affine real valued  function u on Y such that for all f and g in L0: 
fCg  iff ft(f(a))dv>  u(g(.))dv. 
Conversely, if  there exist v and u as  above,  u nonconstant, then the preference 
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relation they induce on Lo satisfies (i), (ii), (iv), (v), and (vii). Finally, the function 
u is unique up to positive linear transformations. 
PROOF:  From  the Implication of  the N-M  Theorem we get a N-M  utility  u 
representing the preference relation  L  induces on Y. By nondegeneracy there are 
f * and f* in  Lo with f* > f*. Monotonicity, (v), implies existence of a state s in 
S  such  that  f*(s)  =y*  >-f*(s)  y*.  Since  u  is  given  up  to  a  positive  linear 
transformation, suppose from now on  u(y*)  = 1 and u(y*) =  -1.  Denote  K = 
u(Y).  Hence  K  is a convex subset of the real line including the interval [1, -  1]. 
For an arbitrary f  in Lo denote 
Mf=  {af+  (1-  a)ySlye  Yand  as  [0,1]). 
Thus Mf is the convex hull of the union of f  and Lc. It is easy to see that any 
two acts in Mf are comonotonic. Hence, there is an affine real-valued function on 
Mf,  which represents the preference relation  t  restricted to Mf. After rescaling, 
this function,  Jf satisfies Jf (y*S)  = 1 and Jf  (ys)  =  -  1. Clearly, if h E Mf n Mg, 
then  Jf (h)  = Jg(h).  So, defining J(f  ) = Jf  (f  ) for f  in  Lo. we get a real valued 
function on  Lo which represents the preferences  -  on  Lo and satisfies for all y 
in  Y: J(yS)  = u(y).  Let  BO(K) denote the i-measurable,  K-valued finite step 
function  on  S. Let U: Lo --  BO(K) be defined by  U(f )(s)  = u(f(s))  for s  in  S 
and f  in  Lo, The function U is onto, and if  U(f)  =  U(g),  then by monotonicity 
f -  g, which in turn  implies J(f ) = J(g). 
We now define a real valued function I on BO(K). Given a in BO(K), let f  in 
Lo be  such that  U(f  ) = a. Then define I(a)  = J(f  ).  I  is well defined since as 
mentioned  earlier J is constant on U-  (a): 
Lo  u-  Bo 
R 
We now have a real valued function I on  BO(K) which satisfies the following 
three conditions: (i) For all a in K: I(aS*)  = a. (ii) For all pairwise comonotonic 
functions  a,  b, and c in BO(K) and a in [0,1]: if I(a)  > I(b)  then I(aa  + (1 - 
a)c)  > I(ab  + (1 -  a)c).  (iii) If  a(s)  >  b(s)  on  S  for a  and  b in  BO(K), then 
I(a)  >  I(b). 
To  see that (i) is satisfied, let  y  in  Y be such that u(y)  = a. Then  J(yS)  = a 
and  U(yS)  = aS*.  Hence I(aS*)  = a. Similarly (ii) is satisfied because comono- 
tonicity  is  preserved by  U  and  J  represents  >-  which  satisfies comonotonic 
independence.  Finally (iii) holds because U preserves monotonicity. 
The Corollary of Section 3 and the Remark following it in Schmeidler (1986) 
say that if a real valued function I on BO(K) satisfies conditions (i), (ii), and (iii), 
then the nonadditive probability v on I  defined by v(E)  = I(E*)  satisfies for all DAVID SCHMEIDLER 
a  and  b inB0(K): 
(*)  I(a)>I(b)  iff  fadv  >fbdv. 
Hence, for all f  and g in L0: 
f  g  iff  fU(f)dv>  s  U(g)dv, 
and the proof of the main  part of the theorem  is completed. 
To prove the opposite  direction  note first  that in Schmeidler  (1986)  it is shown 
and referenced  that if I on Bo(K) is defined  by (*), then it satisfies  conditions 
(i), (ii), and (iii). (Only (ii) requires  some proof.) Secondly,  the assumptions  of 
the opposite direction  say that J is defined  as a combination  of U and I in the 
diagram. Hence the preference  relation on  Lo induced by J  satisfies all the 
required  conditions.  (U preserves  monotonicity  and comonotonicity  and Jsadv is 
a (sup) norm continuous  function  of a.) 
Finally, uniqueness  properties  of the expected utility representation  will be 
proved. Suppose that there exist an affine  real valued function u' on Y and a 
nonadditive  probability  v' on 2  such that for all f  and g in L0: 
(**)  f>  g  iff  su'(f(s))  dv' >  su'(g(s))  dv'. 
s  s 
Note  that monotonicity of  v' can be  derived instead of  assumed. When 
considering (**)  for all  f  and  g  in  Lc we immediately  obtain, from the 
uniqueness  part of the N-M Theorem,  that u' is a positive  linear  transformation 
of u. On the other  hand  it is obvious  that the inequality  in (**) is preserved  under 
positive linear  transformations  of the utility.  Hence,  in order  to prove  that v' = v 
we may assume  without  loss of generality  that u' = u. For an arbitrary  E in 2 let 
f  in Lo be such that U(f)  = E*. (For example,  f(s)  =y*  on E and f(s)  =y*/2 
+ y,/2  on  EC. Then fsU(f)  dv = v(E)  and fsU(f)  dv' = v'(E).)  Let y  in Y be 
such that  u(y)  = v(E).  (For example, y = v(E)y*  + (1 -  v(E))(y*/2  +y,/2).) 
Then f-yS  which in turn implies u(y)  = u'(y)  = fsu'(ys)  dv' = v'(E).  The last 
equality is implied by (**).  Q.E.D. 
In order to extend the Theorem  to more general acts, we have to specify 
precisely  the set of acts L on which the extension  holds and we have to extend 
correspondingly  the definition  of the integral  with respect  to nonadditive  proba- 
bility. We start with the latter. 
Denote by B  the set of real valued, bounded 2-measurable  functions  on S. 
Given a in B and a nonadditive  probability  v on 2  we define 
ladv=  f  (v(a>a)  -1)da±+  |  v(a>a)da. 
s  -00 
Each of the integrands  above  is monotonic,  bounded  and identically  zero where 
a l >X  for  some number X. This definition of  integration for nonnegative 
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functions in  B  has been suggested by Choquet (1955). A more detailed exposi- 
tion appears in Schmeidler (1986). It should be mentioned here that this defini- 
tion  coincides,  of  course, with the one at the beginning of this section when  a 
obtains finitely many values. 
For the next definition, existence of weak order  >-  over Lc is presupposed. An 
act f:  S --  Y is said to be 2-measurable if for all y  in  Y the sets { s lf(s)  >- y } 
and { s f(s)  y } belong to 2.  It is said to be bounded if there are y  and z in Y 
such that  y  f (s)  L z on  S. The set of all 2-measurable bounded acts in  yS  is 
denoted by L(>:).  Clearly, it contains Lo, 
COROLLARY:  (a) Suppose that a preference  relation L  over Lo satisfies (i) weak 
order, (ii) comonotonic  independence,  (iv) continuity, and (v) monotonicity.  Then it 
has a  unique extension to all of L(>-)  which satisfies the same conditions (over 
L(>:)).  (b)  If  the extended relation, also to be denoted by  >-,  is nondegenerate, 
then there exist a unique nonadditive  probability v on 2  and an affine real valued 
function u (unique up to positive linear transformations)  such that  for all f and g in 
L(>-): f s:g  iff fsu(f(-))  dv)  >  su(g(  )) dv. 
PROOF:  The case of degeneracy is obvious, so assume nondegenerate prefer- 
ences. Consider the following diagram: 
L(>)  u,  B(K) 
J'|  Lo  uBo  (Kf)  | 
J  I 
R 
The  inner  triangle is  that  of  the  proof  of  the  Theorem.  B(K)  is  the  set  of 
K-valued,  2-measurable, bounded functions on  S, and i denotes identity.  U' is 
the natural extension of  U and is also onto. Because BO(K) is (sup) norm dense 
in  B(K)  and  I  satisfies condition  (iii),  I'  is  the unique  extension  of  I  that 
satisfies on  B(K)  the three conditions that I  satisfies on  BO(K). 
The functional  J', defined on  L(>,)  by:  J'(f ) = I'(U'(f  )), extends J. Hence, 
the relation  L  on  L(  )  defined by f L g  iff J'( f ) > J'(g)  extends the relation 
>  on  Lo, and satisfies the desired properties. 
By the Corollary of Section 3 in Schmeidler (1986) there exists a nonadditive 
probability  v  on  2  such  that  for  all  f  and  g  in  L(>-):  I'(f)  > I'(g)  iff 
JsU'(f)  dv>  fsU'(g)  dv. 
Hence,  the expected utility representation of the preference relation has been 
shown. To  complete  the proof of  (b), uniqueness of  v  and uniqueness up to  a 
positive  linear transformation of  u have to be established. However, it follows 
from  the  corresponding part of  the Theorem. The  uniqueness properties also 
imply that the extension of  >-  from Lo to L(>,)  is unique.  Q.E.D. DAVID SCHMEIDLER 
REMARK 1:  Instead of first stating the Theorem for Lo and then extending it to 
L(>),  one can state directly the extended theorem. More precisely a preference 
relation on  L, Lo c  L c  yS is defined such that in addition to the conditions (i), 
(ii), (iv), and (vii) it satisfies L = L( >).  It can then be represented by expected 
utility  with  respect  to  nonadditive probability. However, the  first part of  the 
Corollary shows that in this case the preference relation of L( >)  is overspecified: 
The preferences of Lo dictate those over L( >). 
REMARK  2:  If  2  does not contain all subsets of  S,  and  #X>  3 then  L(>) 
contains finite step functions that do not belong to L0. Let y and z in Y be such 
that  y-z  but  y#z,  and  let  EcS  but  E  2.  Define  f(s)=y  on  E  and 
f(s)  = z on  EC. Clearly f  L0. The condition  #X>  3 is required to guarantee 
existence of  y  and z as above. 
REMARK  3:  It is an elementary exercise to show that under the conditions of 
the  Theorem,  v  is  additive iff  >  satisfies (iii) independence (instead of  or in 
addition to (ii) comonotonic independence). Also an extension of an independent 
relation,  as in Corollary (a), is independent. Hence our results formally extend 
the additive theory. 
We now introduce formally the concept of uncertainty aversion alluded to in 
the Introduction. A binary relation  >  on L is said to reveal uncertainty  aversion 
if for any three acts f,  g, and h in L and any a in [0,1]: If f > h and g > h, then 
af+  (1 -  a)g  L h.  Equivalently we may state: If fL  g,  then af+  (1 -  a)g  > g. 
For  definition  of  strict uncertainty aversion the conclusion  should be  a  strict 
preference  >-. However, some restrictions then have to be imposed on f  and g. 
One such obvious restriction is that f  and g are not comonotonic. We will return 
to this question in a subsequent remark. 
Intuitively,  uncertainty aversion means that "smoothing" or averaging utility 
distributions  makes the decision maker better off. Another way is  to  say that 
substituting  objective mixing for  subjective mixing  makes  the  decision  maker 
better off. The definition of uncertainty aversion may become more transparent 
when its full mathematical characterization is presented. 
PROPOSITION:  Suppose that  >  on L=  L(  )  is  the extension of  L  on  Lo 
according to the Corollary. Let v be the derived nonadditive  subjective  probability 
and I  (the I'  of the Corollary) be the functional on B,  I(a)=  fsadv.  Then the 
following conditions are equivalent:  (i)  _  reveals uncertainty  aversion. (ii) For all a 
and b in B: I(a  + b) > I(a)  + I(b).  (iii) For all a and b in B andfor all a in [0,1]: 
I(aa  + (1 -  a)b)  > aI(a)  + (1 -  a)b. 
(iv)  For all a and b in B and for all a in [0,1]: 
I(aa  +  (1 -  a)b)  > min  (a),  I(b)}. 
(v)  For all a in R the sets {a E BII(a)  > a)  are convex. (vi) There exists an a in 
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R s.t.  the set {  a E blI(a)  > a}  is convex. (vii) For all a and b in B and  for all a in 
[0,1]:  If I(a)  = I(b),  then I(aa  + (1 -  a)b)  > I(a).  (viii) For all a and b in B:  If 
I(a)=I(b),  then 
I(a  + b) > I(a)  + I(b). 
(ix)  v is convex. I.e.,  for all E and F in 2: 
v(E)  + v(F)  v(EF)  +  (E+  F). 
(x) For all a in B:  I(a)  = min { fsadplp E core(v)),  where core(v) =  p: 2  -* RI 
p is additive, p(s)  = v(S)  andfor all E in 2,  p(E)  >  v(E)}. 
PROOF: For  any  functional on  B:  (iii)  implies (iv),  (iv) implies (vii), (iv)  is 
equivalent to (v), and (v) implies (vi). The positive homogeneity of degree one of 
I  results in:  (ii)  equivalent to (iii) and (vii) equivalent to (viii). (vi) implies (v) 
because for all ,f in R, (,B = a -  a),  I(a  + 1S*) = I(a)  + /3, and because adding 
PS* preserves convexity. 
(viii) implies (ix). Suppose, without loss of generality, that v(E)  > v(F).  Then 
there is  y > 1 such that  v(E)  = yv(F).  Since I(E*)  = v(E)  = yv(F)  = I(yF*), 
we  have  by  (viii),  v(E)+  yv(F)<  I(E*  + yF*).  But  E* + yF* = (EF)*  + 
(y-  1)F* + (E + F)*,  which  implies  I(E*  + yF*) = v(EF)  + (y -  1)v(F)  + 
v(E  + F).  Inserting the last equality in the inequality above leads to the inequal- 
ity  in  (ix).  The  equivalence of  (ix),  (x),  and  (ii)  is  stated  as  Proposition  3 in 
Schmeidler (1986). 
Last  but  not  least,  (i)  is  equivalent  to  (iv).  This  becomes  obvious  after 
considering  the  mapping  U' from  the diagram in  the proof  of  the Corollary. 
Q.E.D. 
The basic result of the proposition is the equivalence of (i), (iii), (iv), (ix), and 
(x). (iv) is quasiconcavity of I  and it is the translation of (i) by U' from L to B. 
(iii) is concavity, which usually is a stronger assumption. Here I is concave iff it is 
quasiconcave.  Concavity  captures  best  the  heuristic  meaning  of  uncertainty 
aversion. 
REMARK 4:  The Proposition holds if all the inequalities are strict and in (i) it is 
strict uncertainty aversion. To show it precisely, null or dummy events in 2  have 
to be defined. An event E  in 2  is termed dummy if for all F  in 2:  v(F+  E) = 
v(F).  In (ii)-(vii),  in order to state strict inequality one has to assume that a and 
b' are not comonotonic for any b' which differs from b on a dummy set. To have 
a strict inequality in (ix) one has to assume that (E -  F)*,  (EF)*,  and (F-  E)* 
are  not  dummies.  In  (x)  a  geometric condition  on  the  core  of  v  has  to  be 
assumed. 
REMARK  5:  The point  of view of  this work is  that if  the information is  too 
vague  to  be  represented by an additive prior, it  still may be represented by  a 
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nonadditive prior. Another possibility is to represent vague information by a set 
of priors. Condition (x) and its equivalence to other conditions of the Proposition 
point out when the two approaches coincide. 
REMARK  6:  The  concept  of  uncertainty  appeal  can  be  defined  by:  f  >  g 
implies f >  af + (1 -  a)g.  In the Proposition then all  the inequalities have to be 
reversed and maxima have to replace minima. Obviously, additive probability or 
the independence axiom reveal uncertainty neutrality. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4.1.  In the introduction a point of view distinguishing between objective and 
subjective probabilities has been articulated. It is not necessary for the results of 
this  work. What  matters is  that the lotteries in  Y  be  constructed of  additive 
probabilities.  These probabilities can be  subjectively arrived upon.  This is  the 
point  of view of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). They describe their result as a 
way  to  assess  complicated  probabilities,  "horse  lotteries",  assuming  that  the 
probabilities  used  in  the  simpler "roulette  lotteries" are already known.  The 
Theorem  here  can  also  be  interpreted in  this way,  and  one  can  consider  the 
lotteries in  Y as derived within the behavioristic framework as follows: 
Let  Q be  a set (a roulette). An  additive probability P  on all subsets of  Q is 
derived via Savage's Theorem. More specifically, let Z  be a set of outcomes with 
two or more elements. (Suppose that the sets Z and X are disjoint.) Let F denote 
the set of Savage's acts, i.e., all functions from Q to Z. Postulating existence of a 
preference relation on F satisfying Savage's axioms leads to an additive probabil- 
ity P on Q. Next  we identify a lottery, say y, in Y with all the acts from Q to X 
which  induce  the probability distribution  y.  Thus we  have  a  two  step  model 
within  the  framework of  a behavioristic (or personal or  subjective) theory of 
probability. Since the motivation of our Theorem is behavioristic (i.e., derivation 
of  utility  and  probability from preference), the  conceptual  consistency  of  the 
work requires that the probabilities in Y could also be derived from preferences. 
We will return to the question of conceptual consistency in the next remark. 
Instead  of  the  two  step  model of  the previous paragraph one  can  think of 
omitting the roulette lotteries from the model. One natural way to do this is to try 
to extend  Savage's Theorem to nonadditive probability. This has been done by 
Gilboa  (1987). Another approach has been followed by Wakker (1986), wherein 
he substituted a connected topological space for the linear structure of  Y. 
4.2.  In  recent  years many  articles have  been  written which  challenged  the 
expected  utility hypothesis in the von Neumann-Morgenstern model and in the 
model  with  state-dependent acts. We restrict our attention  to  models  that (i) 
introduce functional representation of a preference relation derived from axioms, 
and (ii) separate "utilities" from "probabilities" (in the representation). Further- 
more (iii) we consider functional representations which are sums of products of 
two  numbers;  one  number has  a  "probability" interpretation and  the  other 
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(iii) the reader may consult Fishburn (1985) and the reference there.) Restriction 
(iii)  is  tantamount  to  the functional representation used  in  the Theorem (the 
Choquet  integral). An  article that preceded the present work in  this kind  of 
representation using nonadditive probability is Quiggin (1982). (Thanks for this 
reference  are  due  to  a  referee.) His  result will  be  introduced here somewhat 
indirectly. 
4.2.1. Consider a preference relation over acts satisfying the assumptions, and 
hence the conclusions, of the theorem. Does there exist an additive probability P 
on 2  and a nondecreasing function f  from the unit interval onto itself such that 
v(E)  = f (P(E))  on T? (Such a function f  is referred to as a distortion function.) 
Conditions  leading to a positive answer when the function  f  is increasing are 
well known.  (They are stated as a step in the proof in Savage (1954); see also 
Fishburn (1970).)  In this case  v represents qualitative (or ordinal) probability, 
and the question we deal with can be restated as follows: Under what conditions 
does  a qualitative probability have an additive representation? The problem is 
much more difficult when f  is just nondecreasing but not necessarily increasing. 
A solution has been provided by Gilboa (1985). 
4.2.2.  The  set  of  nonadditive  probabilities  which  can  be  represented as  a 
composition  of a distortion function f  and an additive probability P  is "small" 
relative  to  all  nonadditive  probabilities.  For  example,  consider  the  following 
version of the Ellsberg paradox. There are 90 balls in an urn, 30 black, B, balls 
and all the other balls are either white, W, or red, R. Bets on the color of a ball 
drawn at random from the urn are offered. A correct guess is awarded by $100. 
There are six bets: "B", "R", "W",, "B or W", "R or W", and "B or R". The 
following  preferences constitute an Ellsberg paradox: B >- R  -  W, R  or W >- B 
or R  - B or W. It is impossible to define an additive probability on the events B, 
R, and W such that this probability's (nondecreasing) distortion will be compati- 
ble with the above preferences. 
4.2.3.  In Quiggin's model  X is the set of real numbers. An act is a lottery of 
the form y = (xi,  pi)k  1  where k >  ,x>x2>  >  ,  pi>O  and  p1=l1. 
Quiggin postulates a weak order over all such acts which satisfies several axioms. 
As a result he gets a unique distortion function f  and a monotonic, unique up to 
a positive  linear transformation, utility function u on  X such that the mapping 
y  k=  1(xi -  xi,1)f(,=  pj)  represents  the  preferences.  However,  f(1/2)  = 
1/2.  Quiggin's axioms are not immediate analogues of the assumptions in Section 
2. For example he postulates the existence of certainty equivalence for each act, 
i.e., for every y  there is x  in  X such that y  - x. 
Yaari (1987) simplified Quiggin's axioms and got rid of the restriction f(1/2) 
=  (1/2)  on  the  distortion  function.  However  Yaari's  main  interest  was  the 
uncertainty aversion properties of the distortion function f.  Hence his simplified 
axioms result in linear utility over the set of incomes,  X. He explored the duality 
between concavity of the utility functions in the theory of risk aversion and the 
convexity  of  the  distortion  function  in  the  theory  of  uncertainty  aversion. 
Quiggin extended his results from distributions over the real numbers with finite 
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with arbitrary distribution functions over the real line. Finally, Segal (1984) and 
Chew (1984) got the most general representation for Quiggin's model. 
I  conclude  my  remark on  the  works of  Quiggin, Yaari,  and  Segal with  a 
criticism from a normative, behavioristic point of view: It may seem conceptually 
inconsistent  to  postulate  a  decision  maker who,  while  computing  anticipated 
utility,  assigns  weight  f(p)  to  an  event  known  to  him  to  be  of  probability 
p, p of  (p).  His knowledge of p  is derived, within the behavioristic model, from 
preferences over acts (as in 4.1 above). The use of the terms "anticipation" and 
"weight",  instead  of  "expectation" and "probability" does  not  resolve, in  my 
opinion,  the inconsistencies. One way out would be  to  follow  paragraph 4.2.1 
above and to try to derive simultaneously distorted and additive probabilities of 
events. 
4.3.  The  first version  of  this  work  (Schmeidler (1982))  includes  a  slightly 
extended  version  of  the present Theorem. First recall that  Savage termed an 
event  E null if for all f  and g  in  L:  f = g on  EC implies f -  g. Clearly, if the 
conditions  of the theorem are satisfied then an event is null if  it is dummy. The 
extended version of the Theorem includes the following addition: 
The nonadditive probability v of the Theorem satisfies the following condition: 
v(E)  = 0 implies E is dummy, if and only if the preference relation also satisfies: 
E  is not null, f = g on  E C and f(s)  >- g(s)  on  E  imply f >-  g. 
4.4. The expected utility model has in economic theory two other interpreta- 
tions in addition to decisions under uncertainty. One interpretation is decisions 
over time: s  in  S  represents time or period. The other interpretation of S is the 
set of persons or agents in the society, and the model is applied to the analysis of 
social welfare functions. Our extension of  the expected utility model may have 
the same uses. 
Consider  the  special  case  where  f(s)  is  s  person's  income.  Two  income 
allocations f  and g are comonotonic if the social rank (according to income) of 
any  two  persons  is  not  reversed between  f  and  g.  Comonotonic  f,  g,  and  h 
induce the same social rank on individuals and then f >- g implies yf + (1 -  y)h 
>- yg + (1 - -y) h. This restriction on independence is, of course, consistent with 
strict  uncertainty  aversion  which  can  here  be  interpreted  as  inequality (or 
inequity) aversion. In other words we have here an "Expected Utility" represen- 
tation of a concave Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. 
4.5.  One of  the puzzling phenomena of decisions under uncertainty is people 
buying life insurance and gambling at the same time.2 This behavior is compati- 
ble with the model of this paper. Let SI  =  S1  X  S2  X  S3,  where s1  in S1 describes 
a possible  state of  health of  the decision maker, 52  in  S2  describes a possible 
resolution of the gamble, and s3 in  S3  describes a possible resolution of all other 
relevant uncertainties. Let  v' be  a nonadditive probability on  Si,  i =  0,1,2,3. 
Suppose that vl is strictly convex (i.e., satisfying strict uncertainty aversion), v2 is 
strictly concave  (i.e.,  v2(E) + v2(F)  > v(E U F)  + v(E  n F)  if  E\F  and  F\E 
2 It is not puzzling, as a referee pointed out, if one accepts the Friedman-Savage (1948) explanation 
of this phenomenon. SUBJECTIVE  PROBABILITY 
are nonnull).  Furthermore, if  E° = E1 X E2 X E3,  and  Ei c  S',  then  v°(E°)  = 
vl(El)v2(E2)v3(E3).  To simplify matters suppose that  X is a bounded interval 
of real numbers (representing an income in dollars), and the utility u is linear on 
X. Let the preference relation over acts on  SO be represented by f -  Ju(f ) dv. 
In this case buying insurance and gambling (betting) simultaneously is preferred 
to buying insurance only or gambling only, ceteris parabus. Also either of these 
last two acts is preferred to "no insurance no gambling." 
School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University,  69978 Tel Aviv, Israel 
Manuscript  received  July, 1984; final revision  received  September,  1988. 
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